Abstract: This paper discusses the characteristic properties of List PR systems and FPTP systems, as given in Hout 2005 and Hout et al. 2006. While many of the properties we consider are common to both systems, it turns out (see Hout 2005) that the British system distinguishes itself by satisfying the district cancellation property, while the Dutch system distinguishes itself by satisfying consistency and anonymity. For scoring rules, topsonlyness is equivalent to being party fragmentation-proof (see Hout 2005; Hout et al. 2006). One might present this as an argument in favour of requiring topsonlyness. However, we will also give counter-arguments against insisting upon the property of being party fragmentation-proof.
Introduction
Let V be a finite set of voters; i, j, . . . denote elements of V . I denotes any non-empty subset of V .
Let A be a finite set of alternatives (parties); x, y, . . . denote elements of A. L(A) denotes the set of linear orderings, and W (A) the set of weak orderings on A.
A function c : I → L(A) is called a profile on I; c i := c(i). We write t(c i ) = x to denote that x is at the top of c i .
Let ∆ = {δ 1 , . . . , δ m } be a partition of the set V of voters into constituencies. For each I ⊆ V , ∆ induces a partition ∆ I of I; ∆ I = {δ 1 ∩ I, . . . , δ m ∩ I}.
For c ∈ L(A)
I and δ ∈ ∆, c δ is the restriction of c to δ ∩ I. For c a profile on I, we denote by π c (x) the number of voters in I who have x as first choice in their linear ordering c i of the alternatives.
Definition 1 For c : I → L(A), π c (x) := | {i ∈ I | t(c i ) = x} | . In particular, π c δ (x) = | {i ∈ δ ∩ I | t(c i ) = x} |.
For every subset I of voters, a social preference rule F assigns a weak ordering F (c) to every profile c on I. We state this formally as follows:
Definition 2 A social preference rule is a function F : I⊆V L(A) I → W (A).
So, for every I ⊆ V , F : L(A) I → W (A). (It is understood that F does not depend on the particular set I of voters.) Definition 3 By t(F (c)) we mean the set of top elements of the weak ordering F (c).
t(F (c)) := {x ∈ A | x is a top element of F (c)} Next we define the Dutch and British social preference (or aggregation) rules, called D and B respectively.
Definition 4 : The plurality ranking (PR) rule is the function D : L(A) I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , defined by x D(c) y iff π c (x) ≥ π c (y) (D for Dutch).
Definition 5 Alternative x is said to win in district δ given profile c if x is ranked first in δ by the largest number of voters; i.e., if for all z ∈ A, π c δ (x) ≥ π c δ (z).
Definition 6 τ ∆ c (x) denotes the number of constituencies in which x wins given profile c. τ
Characterizations
Theorems 1 and 2 below characterize the Dutch and British aggregation rules, respectively. The properties in question will subsequently be defined.
Theorem 1 Let F be a social preference rule. F is the plurality ranking rule D if and only if F is consistent, faithful, anonymous, neutral, and topsonly. In addition, these properties are independent.
For the proof, we refer to Hout 2005; Hout et al. 2006 . The properties printed in italics distinguish the plurality ranking rule from the FPTP system, as we will see further on.
Theorem 2 Let F be a social preference rule. F is the FPTP system B if and only if F is subset consistent, district consistent, subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly, Paretian, and satisfies district cancellation. In addition, these properties are independent. Proposition 2 The FPTP system B satisfies all properties of the plurality ranking rule D except FS cancellation, consistency and anonymity.
We initially focus on the cancellation properties.
Definition 8 F satisfies district cancellation iff for all I ⊆ V , for all profiles c on I and for all x, y ∈ A, if |{δ ∈ ∆|x ∈ t(F (c δ ))}| = |{δ ∈ ∆|y ∈ t(F (c δ ))}|, then x ∼ F (c) y.
Lemma 1 Clearly, B satisfies district cancellation, but D does not. Definition 9 A social preference rule F has the FS cancellation property if, for all I ⊆ V , for every c ∈ L(A)
I , and for all
Lemma 2 Clearly, D does satisfy FS cancellation, but B does not.
Counterexample 2: Let A = {x, y, z}, I = V = {1, . . . , 6}, ∆ = {δ 1 , δ 2 } with δ 1 = {1, 2, 3} and δ 2 = {4, 5, 6}. Suppose t(c 1 ) = t(c 2 ) = x, t(c 3 ) = t(c 4 ) = y and t(c 5 ) = t(c 6 ) = z. Then π c (x) = π c (y) = 2, but not x ∼ B(c) y, since x wins in district δ 1 , while y wins in no district.
Topsonlyness requires that, whenever the tops of the individual preference orderings match for two profiles, the social preference rule should choose the same outcome for both profiles. Lemma 3 If F is anonymous, neutral, and topsonly, then F has the FS cancellation property.
Theorem 3 Let F : L(A)
I → W (A), for I ⊆ V , be a social preference rule. F is the plurality ranking rule D iff F is consistent, faithful, and has the FS cancellation property.
Remark 1 (Argument against topsonlyness) The FS Cancellation Property and topsonlyness seem somehow unintuitive: requiring these properties amounts to saying that breadth of support counts and depth of opposition does not. For example, suppose that in Germany in 1933, an equal number of people were to support von Schleicher and Hitler as their first choice. Cancellation and topsonlyness would make the society indifferent between the two, but presumably those who objected to Hitler objected much more strongly than those who objected to von Schleicher.
By consistency of F we mean that if two disjoint sets of voters I and J both socially prefer x to y using F , their union should also socially prefer x to y using F . More precisely (in order to be able to prove Theorem 1):
J are preference profiles for disjoint sets of voters I and J and c + c is the profile on I ∪ J that corresponds with c on I and with c on J, then for all x, y ∈ A: if x F (c) y and x F (c ) y, then x F (c+c ) y.
Lemma 4 Clearly, D is consistent, but B is not.
However, B satisfies subset consistency and district consistency, which we now define.
Subset consistency requires that if two sets of voters within the same constituency use the same social preference rule and the tops of the social orderings they choose have at least one element in common, then the top of the social ordering that their union chooses should contain exactly the shared elements.
Definition 12 Let I δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V and J δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V be disjoint subsets of one single constituency δ. A social preference rule is subset consistent if, whenever c δ ∈ L(A) I δ and c δ ∈ L(A) J δ are preference profiles on I δ and J δ , and c δ + c δ is the profile on I δ ∪ J δ that corresponds to c δ on I δ and to c δ on
District consistency is similar to consistency as defined above in Definition 11, with the proviso that the two sets of voters in question are not only disjoint, but also do not both contain elements of a common constituency. Note that this latter condition is not satisfied in counterexample 3 above, where I and J both contain elements of the same constituency δ 2 .
Definition 13 Let c ∈ L(A)
I and c ∈ L(A) J be preference profiles on disjoint sets of voters I, J ⊆ V . Suppose that, for all δ ∈ ∆, δ ∩ I = ∅ implies δ ∩ J = ∅. Let c + c be the profile on I ∪ J that corresponds with c on I and c on J. Then a social preference rule F is district consistent if, for all x, y ∈ A, if x F (c) y and x F (c ) y, then x F (c+c ) y.
Anonymity means that it does not matter who casts which vote; the names of the voters are irrelevant. In other words, all voters are treated equally. Definition 14 F is anonymous := for all I ⊆ V , for every permutation σ of I, and for all preference profiles c ∈ L(A)
A social preference rule is called subset anonymous if it treats all voters equally when society consists of (a subset of) one single constituency.
Definition 15 A social preference rule F is subset anonymous if, for all δ ∈ ∆, for all I δ ⊆ δ, for every permutation σ of I δ , and for all preference profiles c δ ∈ L(A)
Lemma 5 Clearly, D is anonymous, but B is not.
Counterexample 4: Let A = {x, y, z}, I = V = {1, . . . , 6}, ∆ = {δ 1 , δ 2 } with δ 1 = {1, 2, 3} and δ 2 = {4, 5, 6}, σ(1) = 4 and σ(4) = 1. Let c be as indicated in the table below. So, B is not anonymous, but it is clearly subset anonymous.
Summarizing:
• D and B have the following properties in common: faithful, neutral, topsonly, subset consistent, district consistent, subset anonymous, Pareto optimal.
• D is consistent and anonymous (and satisfies FS cancellation), but does not satisfy district cancellation.
• B satisfies district cancellation (but not FS cancellation), but is not consistent or anonymous. In order to make this paper self-contained, below we will give precise definitions of the properties mentioned which have not been treated earlier in this paper.
A social preference rule F is faithful if, in case society consists of a single individual whose most preferred party is x, it orders this party x first. More precisely:
Definition 16 A social preference rule F is faithful iff, for all i ∈ V , for all c i ∈ L(A) {i} , and for all
Neutrality means that all parties are treated equally.
Definition 17 A social preference rule F is neutral if, for every permutation λ of A, for all I ⊆ V , and for every preference profile c ∈ L(A) I , F (λc) = λF (c).
Pareto optimality requires that, whenever all individuals prefer x to y, then y is not ranked first socially.
Definition 18 A social preference rule F is Pareto optimal if, for all parties x, y ∈ A, for all I ⊆ V , and for all preference profiles c ∈ L(A) I : if x ci y for all i ∈ I, then y / ∈ t(F (c)).
In Hout 2005; Hout and de Swart 2007, the following Lemma is shown.
Lemma 6 If F is subset anonymous, neutral, topsonly, and Pareto optimal, then F has the subset cancellation property.
As a consequence, both D and B have the subset cancellation property. Subset cancellation demands that when a set of voters is a subset of one single constituency and all alternatives that receive a nonzero vote total tie, the social preference rule should rank this whole set of alternatives first.
Definition 19 A social preference rule F has the subset cancellation property if, for all δ ∈ ∆, for all I δ ⊆ δ ⊆ V , and for every c δ ∈ L(A) I δ , if for all parties x, y ∈ A with π c δ (x) = 0 and π c δ (y) = 0, π c δ (x) = π c δ (y), then t(F (c δ )) = {x ∈ A | π c δ (x) = 0}.
• D satisfies FS and subset cancellation, but not district cancellation.
• B satisfies district and subset cancellation, but not FS cancellation.
Seat Share Allocation
In Remark 1 we have argued against the property of topsonlyness (and of FS cancellation). However, a tentative argument in favour of topsonlyness might be the following.
In representative democracies we can distinguish two stages of decisionmaking : (1) the electorate chooses representatives; (2) the representatives make binding decisions. Instead of modelling List PR systems by the plurality ranking rule, we might model them by a seat share allocation rule, where a seat share allocation rule is a function that assigns to each profile for each party a seat share for this party. One might argue that such a seat share allocation rule should be party fragmentation-proof; that is, a party x cannot obtain a larger seat share by splitting up into two parties x 1 and x 2 with similar policy positions.
The Borda rule has all characteristic properties of D except topsonlyness, but it is not party fragmentation-proof, as becomes clear from the following example: Then Borda score (x) = 2 and Borda score (y) = 2. So, x and y would receive an equal allocation of seats. Now suppose x splits into x 1 and x 2 with similar policy positions. Then these 4 voters will (probably) have the following preference orderings.
But then Borda score (x 1 ) = 4, Borda score (x 2 ) = 4, and Borda score (y) = 4. So, x 1 and x 2 together would receive twice the seat share of y.
In Hout 2005; Hout and de Swart 2007, the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 4 A scoring seat share allocation rule is party fragmentation-proof if and only if it is topsonly.
One might be tempted to see this theorem as an argument in favour of topsonlyness and against the Borda rule. On the other hand, we present below an argument against requiring this property of being party fragmentation-proof.
Remark 2 (Arguments against party fragmentation-proofness) It seems reasonable to expect, under a non-topsonly seat allocation rule, that parties will fragment until the gain from fragmentation is no longer unambiguously positive. If so, the desirability of being fragmentation-proof is unclear: there would be fragmentation to the point of allowing voters to support their desired wing of a party, without so much fragmentation as to cause complete disarray. Fragmentation may give voters a more precise way of expressing their desires. In the above example, if party x can increase its share of seats by splitting into x 1 and x 2 at the expense of party y, then party y can do the same thing. If the eventual outcome is to give the voters the largest possible set of alternatives (at least relative to their preferences), is that undesirable? It does not seem to harm the voters, because they can form a complete linear ordering over an arbitrary list of parties. Additionally, it may be possible that there is an upper bound on a given party's share of seats, no matter how many times it fragments.
Finally, we give below the precise definitions of the notions involved.
Definition 20 Let m be the number of alternatives in A and v = v 1 , . . . , v m be a scoring vector (i.e.,
is the seat share function that assigns to any party x ∈ A its seat share τv,c(x) τv(c) . Here τ v,ci (x) = v k iff x is the kth preference of voter i. τ v,c (x) is the sum of the scores for party x ∈ A over all the individuals in profile c, and τ v (c) is the total score of a profile c, summed over all parties.
Let A = (A − {x}) ∪ {x 1 , x 2 } and let c ∈ L(A ) I be the profile that corresponds with profile c ∈ L(A) I , except that party x 1 and party x 2 take the position of party x in the preference orderings of the voters. So, if for example x is ordered second by some individual at c, then x 1 is ordered second and x 2 is ordered third at c or x 2 is ordered second and x 1 is ordered third at c .
A is party fragmentationproof if there exist no party x and profile c such that
, where x 1 and x 2 result from splitting up party x in two parties with similar policy positions, c results from c as described above and v is some scoring vector
A is topsonly iff for all for all i ∈ {2, . . . , m}, v i = 0.
Concluding Remarks
In the above, we have presented arguments both in favour and against the properties that distinguish the Dutch PR electoral system from the British FPTP system. We conclude with an elaboration of these arguments.
The principle behind counterexamples 2 and 4 is essentially that of gerrymandering. In any system with electoral districts, there is always the possibility that the districts can be redrawn; this is what in effect counterexample 2 does. Likewise, voters may change their electoral clout by moving across districts, which is what the voter-swapping in counterexample 4 shows. The Dutch List system does not have these issues arise essentially because it has no districts. Thus, the arguments in this paper highlight the well-known conflict between the principles of one-citizen one-vote and one-state one-vote.
The violations of FS cancellation and anonymity, when viewed in this light, are part of the arguments one might make in favour of the FPTP system. For example, on 1 January 2007, the European Union had 30 million new inhabitants join (22 million from Romania and 8 million from Bulgaria), with per capita GDP of just under $9.000 on a purchasing power parity basis. At the time, EU member Finland had just over 5 million inhabitants, and a per capita GDP of just over $31.000. Under a system without FS cancellation or anonymity (i.e., one with political districts), Finland was willing to support Bulgaria and Romania as entrants to the EU. The presence of districts provides some degree of protection to small groups, and may make them willing to trade and interact with larger but poorer groups.
In the discussion above about party fragmentation-proofness, there is an implicit distinction between fragmentation along ideological divisions and nonideological fragmentation. More specifically, if parties fragment for strategic reasons, the splits may be along philosophical or personality lines, in which case voters are given a more precise way of expressing their desires. On the other hand, if fragmentation does not enable voters to choose among different wings of the pre-fragmentation party or to express opinions on some sort of leadership personality clashes, then the fragmentation would seem to benefit only the party and not necessarily the electorate.
Even if one grants that party fragmentation-proofness is desirable, any analysis of the merits of topsonlyness needs to be made cautiously. For example, suppose that parties x and y are the only contenders. The example from Hout and McGann 2004 only shows what happens if x acts in isolation and if y neither responds nor credibly threatens to respond. Unless y cannot also fragment, the party fragmentation in the example may not be equilibrium.
When y can also fragment, it is unclear that any non-ideological fragmentation can occur. For example, if both parties enjoy equal support and can field equally many candidates, then one equilibrium would be for each party to adopt the following fragmentation strategy: retain the current composition as long as the other party does so, and fragment completely (i.e., into individual candidates) if the other party fragments at all. As long as both x and y are no better off with all parties disbanded than they are with the current two parties, it would be an equilibrium for neither party ever to fragment. In practice, party fragmentation seems rare, though the former USSR was able to increase its seat count in the United Nations by fragmenting into fifteen new states. (The improved seat count, however, is unlikely to have had much to do with the fragmentation.) Suppose, however, that parties do fragment, and consider the extreme case where all parties keep fragmenting in order to improve their outcomes under a Borda-like scheme. What is the result? The fragmentation can end when the voters eventually see a list of independent candidates, with no political parties. This is the ideal that James Madison argued for in Federalist #10, when writing about the destructiveness of factions. If voters are fully empowered to choose their favourite candidates, and find themselves in a world where politicians do not form factions, then it is not immediately obvious that the public suffers.
It should be pointed out that topsonlyness has other properties that are often viewed as desirable. For example, in Berga 2004 it is shown that strategyproofness is related to topsonlyness in the case of single-plateaued preferences (the condition is called plateau-onlyness there).
Hence we do not come down unambiguously in favour of one system over the other, and must be content to characterize the properties of each system. The Dutch and the British have been aware of each other for some time, and have had many chances to observe one another's electoral systems in practice. Presumably if one system were dominant in some sense over the other, we would have seen voters in the country with the dominated system choose to change their electoral procedures. Nevertheless, the formalization of the properties of both that are presented here enable us to clarify the trade-offs faced when choosing between the two systems. To be found at http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/ humanities/dphil/staff/swart/papers.html
